Ideology Blinds Us
My ears are bleeding, from the non-stop drone of RT’s and Aljazeera’s “Sectarian warfare in the Middle East” narrative. As long as we fail to understand how bad the flow of disinformation into the Beltway is, we will all continue to wallow in the dark.
THE GROUND RULES
- Drop any preconceived notions you may have about the sources of terrorism, sectarianism, caliphates, geopolitical alliances
- Remove yourself from your prejudices against either conservatives or liberals (come on, we all have them)
- Never assume malice, when a situation can be easily attributed to ideology (which, generally speaking, makes us all stupid)
Let’s just set the record straight, shall we?
“SECTARIAN WARFARE” IS A BULLSHIT NARRATIVE
For a couple perspectives that question the narrative, which don’t go nearly far enough, I’ll throw these out there:
But I want to talk about the dissection of the narrative from a practical perspective.
Let’s consider a few regional relationships that AREN’T “sectarian”.
- Qatar’s relationship with Iran isn’t “Sectarian”
- Syria’s relationship with ISIS isn’t “Sectarian”
- Russia’s relationship with ISIS isn’t “Sectarian”
- Hmmm…doesn’t really look like Iran’s relationship with ISIS is “Sectarian”
Could someone actually point out some sectarianism? Because I’m having a hard time finding any.
ISIS: THE ANSWER IS STARING US IN THE FACE
I sometimes wonder if when the Soviets came up with the term “Active Measures” they were purposefully ambiguous. “Weaponized Irony” or “Weaponized Ideology” would be a more accurate way to refer to them.
To oversimplify, the point to Active Measures is to get everyone to contemplate reality through an ideological veil.
For example, if you were somehow influenced to believe that ISIS is the product of a caliphate, you would have a difficult time accepting that non-Muslims or, dare I say, CHRISTIANS might somehow be involved in supplying arms to Islamist terrorists.
Additionally, you might miss an important detail because it’s counterintuitive or fail to understand the dynamics of important geopolitical machinations because you’re overlooking details, based upon preconceived notions.
And such is the case with ISIS.
Logically, one would assume some level of coordination, or at least cooperation, if Assad’s cellular service repairman still go into ISIS-controlled parts of Syria in order to repair damaged cellular towers.
And, frankly, ISIS has left a trail of breadcrumbs behind them that ought to be self-explanatory to anyone who can put two thoughts together.
For example, what conclusions can we make, when we discover that ISIS hackers are really Russian hackers?